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I. Introduction 
The Middle East has experienced great tumult in the past decade, culminating in the 
“Arab Spring.” During these exciting times, Middle Eastern dictators have toppled like dominoes 
as Lybia’s Moammar Gadhafi, Yemen’s Ali Abdullah-Saleh, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, and Iraq’s 
Saddam Hussein have all been removed from posts from which they ruled as though kings. I will 
examine the trials of two of these dictators, Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein, and postulate 
that the flaws of the trials are preventing the nations’ national reconciliation and further social 
and political evolution.  
After this introduction, Part II will explore the rise and fall of Hosni Mubarak and 
Saddam Hussein, the flawed trials which were used to prosecute them and the path of Egypt and 
Iraq after their dictator’s trials. Part III will explore the policy rationales underlying dictator 
trials, policy prescriptions for trying dictators and how the trials of Hosni Mubarak and Saddam 
Hussein differed from those policy prescriptions and the reason, if any, behind that deviation. 
Part IV will explore the process of national reconciliation within the framework of tribunals and 
further fact finding missions and how Egypt and Iraq fell short of that framework. Part V will 
present my conclusion that a trial of a deposed dictator is not sufficient to achieve the national 
reconciliation necessary to allow for a nation’s further development.  
II. It has been argued that “prosecution is the only real means of retribution.”1 
 
A. The Last Pharaoh of Egypt: Hosni Mubarak 
Hosni Mubarak (“Mubarak”) was a military man before becoming a politician, first 
attending the Royal Military Academy and then enlisting in the Egyptian air forces.
2
 Mubarak 
                                                          
1
 GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 388 (The New Press, 
3d ed., 1997). 
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would rise through the ranks of the military until April 1975 when he was appointed to his first 
political post as Vice President by then-President Anwar Sadat.
3
 Subsequently, President Sadat 
would be assassinated and Mubarak would be appointed President in October 1981, a post that 
Mubarak retained for the next three decades.
4
  
Under Mubarak’s rule, Egypt became an autocratic political system dominated by the 
executive branch.
5
 Mubarak governed Egypt as though it was an absolute monarchy, becoming 
deeply involved in all decisions, regardless of how big or small, which involved the state and, at 
times, eschewed even advisors.
6
 While Mubarak did undertake limited economic reforms, the 
process was slow and in 1997, privatization schemes accounted for only approximately 15% of 
the known public sector.
7
 In spite of Mubarak’s economic reforms, the Egyptian economy 
continued to rely heavily on its two historic engines of growth, the public sector and oil.
8
 While 
Egypt did experience a period of economic growth in the late 1990’s, the economy spiraled 
downward after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on America.
9
 Mubarak’s attempt to curtail Egypt’s 
post-9/11 downward economic spiral was viewed with suspicion by the Egyptian public as 
Mubarak awarded key governmental positions to loyal associates, such as his own son Gamal 
Mubarak; a move that many feared to be a precursor to the hereditary transition of power from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2
 Charles Robert Davidson, Reform and Repression in Mubarak’s Egypt, 24 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 75, 75 
(2000). 
3
 Id. 
4
 Id. at 75; see also Profile: Hosni Mubarak, BBC NEWS, April 13, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-12301713. 
5
 Davidson, supra note 2, at 80 (While Hosni Mubarak was re-elected to the post of president four times, three of 
those contests were unopposed. While the fourth election heralded the participation of opposition parties, critics 
alleged that the elections were heavily rigged in favor of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party.); Hosni Mubarak: 
Profile, supra note 4; see also Egypt, FREEDOM HOUSE, 2009, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2009/egypt (the contested September 2005 elections consisted of low voter turnout and intimidation of voters 
by government forces).  
6
 Davidson, supra note 2, at 80. 
7
 See generally, id. 
8
 Alison Elizabeth Chase, The Politics of Lending and Reform: The International Monetary Fund and the Nation of 
Egypt, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 193, 212 (2006).  
9
 Egypt, supra note 5. 
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father to son.
10
 Furthermore, regardless of the official economic statistics, many Egyptians 
believed Mubarak’s economic policy to have enriched a select few who were a part of the 
Mubarak inner circle while consigning the remainder of Egypt’s 80 million citizens to live in 
squalor.
11
  
Egyptians lived under martial law for the entirety of Mubarak’s reign.12 Martial law was 
instituted after President Sadat’s assassination and allowed security forces to detain civilians 
with no warrants and to try civilians in military courts.
13
 Opposition groups argued that martial 
law allowed the Mubarak regime to repress political expression, repress freedom of the press and 
intimidate journalists.
14
  
After nearly three decades of rule, Mubarak’s fall from power was practically 
instantaneous as Mubarak resigned from the presidency after street protests lasting a mere 18 
days.
15
 The street protests which would lead to Mubarak’s down fall were inspired by the events 
of neighboring Tunisia as a group of Egyptians youths organized a protest, through social media 
such as Facebook, Twitter, and Facebook, for January 25, 2011, Egypt’s National Police Day 
holiday.
16
 Tens of thousands of Egyptian citizens responded to the protestor’s call and streamed 
into Cairo’s Tahrir Square.17 In responding to the protests at Tahrir Square, police officers used 
excessive force, including tear gas bombs and non-lethal weapons and arrests, to dispel the 
                                                          
10
 Id. 
11
 Sarah Mikhail & Dina Zayed, Egypt puts Mubarak on Trial, Transfixing Arab World, REUTERS, Aug. 3, 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/03/us-egypt-mubarak-idUSL6E7J301D20110803. 
12
 Profile: Hosni Mubarak, AL JAZEERA, last modified Feb. 11, 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/12/200912693048491779.html. 
13
 Id. 
14
 Id. 
15
 Hosni Mubarak Trial Resumes After Two Month Delay, GUARDIAN , Dec. 28, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/28/hosni-mubarak-trial-resumes; see generally Ahmed Eldakak, 
Approaching Rule of Law in Post-Revolution Egypt: Where We Were, Where We Are, and Where We Should Be, 18 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 261, 267 (2012).  
16
 Id. at 268. 
17
 Id. at 269. 
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largely peaceful protestors.
18
 The excessive force used by the police officers would not deter the 
protesters who gathered in even greater number in Tahrir Square the following day.
19
  
Protest organizers would subsequently organize another day of protests, scheduled for 
January 28, 2011.
20
 While the Mubarak regime attempted to prevent the protests by restricting 
internet and telephone services, the protestors were undeterred and gathered in even greater 
numbers to protest, numbering more than a million around the country.
21
 Police continued to use 
excessive force to dispel the protestors, leading to clashes between police and protestors in which 
the police were overwhelmed.
22
 The absence of police presence on the street left a vacuum, filled 
by the Army Forces troops and tanks ordered by Mubarak to protect public property under 
attack.
23
  
On January 29, 2011, Mubarak attempted to appease the protestors by firing his cabinet 
and appointing a vice president, Omar Suleiman, a long standing demand of Egyptians.
24
 
Unappeased, the protestors continued to demonstrate until February 2, 2011, which would prove 
to be a dramatic turning point for the protestors. 
25
 On February 2, armed thugs attacked 
protestors in Tahrir Square while the Army Forces stood by idle and made no attempt to stop the 
violence.
26
 The February 2 violence provided the necessary impetus to force the Army Forces to 
take actions and, over the next several days, the Armed Forces pursued and arrested the armed 
thugs.
27
 The violence perpetuated by the armed thugs against the protestors on February 2 would 
result in the deaths of approximately 850 protestors and comprise the future charges against 
                                                          
18
 Id.  
19
 Id. at 270. 
20
 Id.  
21
 Id.  
22
 Id. at 271. 
23
 Id.  
24
 Id.  
25
 Id. at 272. 
26
 Id. at 273. 
27
 Id.  
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Mubarak.
28
 The massacre would also sound the death knell for Mubarak’s reign as president as 
various military officials signaled that he would be stepping down in accordance with protestor 
demands.
29
 On February 10, Mubarak delegated his powers to the newly appointed vice-
president, Omar Suleiman, but remained on as president of Egypt.
30
 Protestors, unsatisfied with 
Mubarak remaining in power in any capacity, continued to protest until February 11, when Vice 
President Suleiman finally announced that Mubarak has resigned and the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (“SCAF”) would rule Egypt.31 In a text issued by the military, Communique 2, the 
military promised to ensure a peaceful transition of power.
32
 Once again, Egyptians would have 
to rely on the military to put the country in order.
33
 
After Mubarak’s resignation as president, he re-located to the Red Sea resort town of 
Sharm el-Sheikh.
34
 The decision to put Mubarak on trial was made only after mass 
demonstrations by Egyptian citizens calling for Mubarak to be held accountable.
35
 Mubarak’s 
detention pending investigation began on April 13, 2011,
36
 and he would subsequently be flown 
                                                          
28
 Mikhail & Zayed , supra note 11. 
29
 Chris McGreal & Alexandra Topping, Mubarak Resignation Rumours Grow, GUARDIAN, Feb. 10, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/10/mubarak-resignation-rumours-grow. 
30
 Eldakak, supra note 15, at 274. 
31
 Id. at 274-75. 
32
 McGreal & Topping, supra note 29; see also Text of Communique No. 2 from the Egyptian Military, MCCLATCHY 
NEWSPAPERS, Feb. 12, 2011, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/02/12/108638/text-of-communique-no-2-from-
the.html (the military would also promise such landmarks of democracy as holding elections and lifting emergency 
rule). 
33
 Karl Vick, Egypt’s Last Pharaoh? The Rise and Fall of Hosni Mubarak, TIME, Feb. 12, 2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2048689,00.html (the military had previously deposed of the last 
pharaoh of Egypt, Farouk I, in 1952); see also Text of Communique No. 2 from the Egyptian Military, supra note 32. 
34
 Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak Appears in Court, AL-JAZEERA, last modified Aug. 3, 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/08/2011837525919537.html. 
35
 How Will Mubarak’s Trial Shape Egypt’s Transition? PBS NEWSHOUR, May 25, 2011, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june11/egypt_05-25.html. 
36
 Egypt: Q&A on the Trial of Hosni Mubarak, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 28, 2012, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/28/egypt-qa-trial-hosni-mubarak. 
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into Cairo from Sharm el-Sheikh to be put on trial.
37
 Mubarak would plead innocent to charges 
of corruption and to giving orders to kill protestors.
38
  
While Mubarak had been battling illness, and was carried into the courtroom on a 
hospital stretcher, an Al-Jazeera correspondent reported that Mubarak had dyed his hair black 
and looked well and alert at the time of the trial.
39
 From the inception of the trial, it was clear that 
the trial would prove to be divisive as skirmishes between Mubarak’s supporters and critics,40 
forced riot police to separate the two groups.
41
 Groups of Mubarak supporters and critics 
demonstrated outside the courtroom for the duration of the trial.
42
  
In addition to the feuding factions of Mubarak critics and supporters clashing outside the 
courtroom,
43
 the trial inside the courtroom was also marred by uncertainty and feuds.
44
 A source 
of controversy was whether Mubarak should be tried in an Egyptian criminal court or a 
revolutionary tribunal.
45
 The advantage of trying Mubarak in a revolutionary court is that it 
would allow Egypt to try Mubarak for all the crimes which he committed during his rule.
46
 
Ultimately, Mubarak would be tried in an Egyptian criminal court to ensure that the verdict 
                                                          
37
 Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak Appears in Court, supra note 34; Chris Irvine & Tom Chivers, Hosni Mubarak Trial: As 
it Happened, THE TELEGRAPH, Aug. 3, 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8678565/Hosni-Mubarak-trial-as-it-
happened.html. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak Appears in Court, supra note 34.  
40
 Larbi Sadiki, Egypt: The Trial of a Century, AL-JAZEERA, Aug. 15, 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/201181511221937632.html (The critics of Mubarak represent 
the majority of the public, including former Mubarak supporters, and unify in vilifying the Mubarak era of 
dictatorship and corruption. However, there are some Mubarak supporters and include one group named Ehna 
Asfeen ya Rayyis [O president, we are sorry]); see also Mikhail & Zayed , supra note 11; Irvine & Chivers, supra 
note 37. 
41
 Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak Appears in Court, supra note 34. 
42
 See Military Ruler Testifies in Mubarak Trial, AL-JAZEERA, last modified Sept. 25, 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/09/201192410551080602.html. 
43
 Sadiki, supra note 40.  
44
 Id.  
45
 Egyptians Dismayed by Mubarak Retrial, THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE, Apr. 21, 2013, 
http://213.158.162.45/~egyptian/?action=news&id=29099. 
46
 Id. 
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would be accepted by the international community.
47
 International acceptance of the verdict 
would allow Egypt to repatriate money held in foreign bank accounts by Mubarak and his 
associates.
48
 However, there would be two major disadvantages to trying Mubarak in an 
Egyptian criminal court, Mubarak would only be charged with the January 25 through January 
31 protestor deaths rather than crimes which he committed during his nearly three decade rule, 
and the court would require a higher burden of proof, in which Mubarak could only be convicted 
for his own actions, rather than crimes which occurred during his rule.
49
  
Another source of disagreement was whether Mubarak should be tried in a military court 
or civilian court.
50
 Proponents of trying Mubarak in a civilian court argued that Mubarak 
forfeited his military rank and became a civilian when he was appointed to the post of deputy 
president and therefore, Mubarak should be tried as a civilian.
51
 Proponents of trying Mubarak in 
a military court argued that after Mubarak forfeited his position as president, he reverted to his 
military rank pursuant to Law 35 of 1979, allowing for top generals to be restored to their 
military rank upon the expiration of their civilian assignments.
52
  
On August 3, 2011, Mubarak’s trial in a civilian tribunal pursuant to the Egyptian 
criminal code began.
53
 Mubarak was charged with violating Article 40 of the Egyptian criminal 
code, prohibiting the incitement of a felony, when he ordered his security forces to use live 
ammunition against peaceful prosecutors between January 25 and January 31, 2011.
54
 While the 
                                                          
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Sadiki, supra note 40. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Gregg Carlstrom, Q&A: The Mubarak Retrial, AL-JAZEERA, last modified Apr. 13, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/05/201253118819749554.html. 
54
 Id., see also Egypt: Q&A on the Trial of Hosni Mubarak, supra note 36. 
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trial would commence on August 3, 2011,
55
 it was delayed for 2 months in late October as 
lawyers for the victims filed a motion seeking presiding Judge Ahmed Refaat’s recusal due to a 
perceived bias.
56
 The allegations of bias were based on the following: Judge Refaat’s brother 
wrote pro-Mubarak articles, Judge Refaat investigated two judges who had spoken out against 
alleged rigging of the 2005 Egyptian elections; and Judge Refaat had given preferential treatment 
to defense counsel over counsel for the victims in the Mubarak trial.
57
 The Cairo Appeals Court 
subsequently rejected victims’ counsel’s motion to remove Judge Refaat for lack of evidence and 
the trial resumed on December 28, 2011.
58
 On June 2, 2012, Judge Refaat announced his verdict: 
life imprisonment.
59
 In explaining his decision, Judge Refaat cited the conflicting testimony of 
the prosecutor’s witnesses as well as a lack of technical evidence that would sufficiently 
demonstrate that the victim’s cause of death were gunshot wounds.60 
Mubarak’s verdict was subsequently overturned and a retrial ordered which would focus 
on whether Mubarak failed to prevent the killing of protestors in the 2011 uprising that 
overthrew his regime.
61
 Originally scheduled for April 13, 2013, the re-trial however the 
proceeding was unexpectedly postponed when the judge, Mustafa Hassan Abdallah unexpectedly 
recused himself from the trial.
62
 The reason for Judge Adballah’s recusal remains a mystery, as 
                                                          
55
 Mubarak on Trial: Middle East Live- Wednesday 3 August 2011, GUARDIAN, Aug. 3, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/middle-east-live/2011/aug/03/egypt-syria-libya-middle-east-unrest. 
56
 Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, Mubarak Trial Put on Hold in Egypt, CNN, Oct. 30, 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/30/world/meast/egypt-mubarak-trial. 
57
 Egypt: Q&A on the Trial of Hosni Mubarak, supra note 36. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Anwaar Abdalla, A Disappointing Verdict in the Mubarak Trial, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Jun. 4, 2012, 
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/egypt-pyramids-and-revolution/2012/jun/4/disapointing-
verdict-mubarak-trial/. 
60
 Id.; see also Egyptians Dismayed by Mubarak Retrial, supra note 45 (Mubarak was sentenced to life 
imprisonment rather than the death sentence because Judge Refaat could find no clear evidence that Mubarak gave 
instructions to shoot the protestors.) 
61
 Egyptian Appeals Court Orders Mubarak Retrial, THE JORDAN TIMES, Jan. 14, 2013, 
http://jordantimes.com/article/egyptian-appeals-court-orders-mubarak-retrial. 
62
 Ben Brumfield & Salma Abdelaziz, Judge Walks Out on Retrial of Deposed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, 
CNN, Apr. 13, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/13/world/meast/egypt-mubarak-retrial/index.html. 
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various news sources have cited a variety of reasons , including a medical condition affecting his 
eyes
63
 or a possible conflict of interests based on his earlier acquittal of the Camel Battle 
defendants,
64
 Mubarak’s re-trial has been re-scheduled for May 11, 2013.65 
The reversal of the Mubarak verdict had been widely expected by trial pundits, as even 
Judge Refaat, the presiding judge, “criticized the prosecution's case, saying it lacked concrete 
evidence and that nothing that it presented to the court proved that the protesters were killed by 
the police.”66 The decision to retry Mubarak was greeted by some with delight, as crowds 
gathered to celebrate the verdict.
67
 However, these demonstrations paled in comparison to the 
mass celebrations which greeted Mubarak’s original guilty verdict in June 2012.68 There is a 
hope that the decrease in the fervent support for Mubarak indicates that the country, as a whole, 
has moved past the Mubarak era to concentrate on the problems at hand, including a “crippling 
economic crisis and anx[iety] over its future direction.”69 Mubarak continues to divide the nation 
and to draw both supporters and protestors.
70
 On the first scheduled date of the retrial, April 13, 
2013, dozens of protestors, as well as pro-Mubarak activists, surrounded the courthouse.
71
 Once 
                                                          
63
 Id. 
64
 Ahmed Aboul Enein, Mubarak Ordered back to Tora, Retrial in May, DAILY NEWS: EGYPT, Apr. 17, 2013, 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/04/17/mubarak-ordered-back-to-tora-retrial-in-may/; Egypt:24 Acquitted in 
‘Camel Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/world/middleeast/egyptian-court-
acquits-24-mubarak-loyalists-in-camel-battle.html?_r=0 (The Camel Battle defendants, compromised of a total of 24 
individuals. were accused of charging into protester crowds in Cairo on camel-back and were subsequently acquitted 
of manslaughter and attempted murder charges by Judge Abdallah.) 
65
 Aya Batrawy, Egypt Court Sets May 11 for Mubarak Retrial, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 17, 2013, 
http://news.yahoo.com/egypt-court-sets-may-11-mubarak-retrial-134751204.html. 
66
 Egyptian Appeals Court Orders Mubarak Retrial, supra note 61. 
67
 Id. (“A small crowd of Mubarak loyalists in the courtroom erupted with applause and cheers after the ruling was 
read out. Holding portraits of the former president aloft, they broke into chants of "Long live justice". Another 
jubilant crowd later gathered outside the Nile-side hospital where Mubarak is being held in the Cairo district of 
Maadi, where they passed out candy to pedestrians and motorists.”) 
68
 Id. 
69
 Id. 
70
 Brumfield & Abdelaziz, supra note 62. 
71
 Id. 
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again, police forces had to separate the pro and anti-Mubarak protestors.
72
 Mubarak’s transfer 
from court house to prison was also delayed by pro-Mubarak demonstrators.
73
  
 Many Egyptians fear that the Mubarak retrial is merely a show trial and Mubarak himself 
will never be brought to justice.
74
 However, a retrial simply presents a new opportunity for the 
nation to be torn asunder as prosecutors in the retrial will be allowed to present information 
which was not presented in the original trial.
75
 During the retrial, the prosecution will be able to 
argue that Mubarak watched the revolt unfold around him in his palace via a live television 
feed.
76
 If the prosecution were to offer such evidence, it would be in direct contradiction to the 
defense’s argument that Mubarak did not realize the extent of the protests and was not aware of 
the killings.
77
 While the additional fact finding that will be allowed at the retrial may reassure the 
many Egyptians who believed the first trial to be a mere show trial or were disillusioned with the 
trial process because Mubarak’s conviction was for a failure to stop the killings rather than 
actually ordering the killings, the truth which the additional fact finding unearths could also 
bring unrest to the nation.
78
 The report, besides showing that Mubarak was aware of the 
demonstrations and subsequent violence, also implicates military and security officials in the 
deaths.
79
 As these military and security officials are part of the post-Mubarak government under 
                                                          
72
 Id. 
73
 Batrawy, supra note 65. 
74
 Brumfield & Abdelaziz, supra note 62 (Galal Faisal Ali, whose brother Naser died in the protests is quoted as 
saying "The government is not giving us the moral support we need and they're allowing this circus of a trial to 
continue. We were hoping for a death sentence but the way it's going, we may see Mubarak free, and his sons free, 
which means my brother died for nothing.) 
75
 Egyptian Appeals Court Orders Mubarak Retrial, supra note 61. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. 
79
 Egyptian Appeals Court Orders Mubarak Retrial, supra note 61. 
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current president Mohamed Morsi (“Morsi”),80 any implication of the officials in the Mubarak-
era violent repressions of demonstrators may start a backlash against the fragile current regime.
81
 
Conversely, it is also possible that the possible implication of Mubarak-era government officials 
currently working for the Morsi government may lead to a repression of the Mubarak trial by the 
Morsi government in an attempt to prevent the association of the Mubarak government with the 
new “democratically” elected Morsi government. 
 Morsi’s party, the Freedom and Justice Party, has criticized the judiciary in recent 
months, arguing that the acquittals of Mubarak-era figures show that the revolution is not 
complete.
82
 In a rare display of solidarity, the opposition has agreed with the premise that the 
judiciary is still too pro-Mubarak and has argued that the Morsi government has not done enough 
to reform the judiciary.
83
 This is a concern shared by the wider Egyptian population who reason 
that Mubarak and Mubarak-era officials cannot be brought to justice when the judicial system 
used to try them retains officials whose appointments were made by Mubarak or Mubarak-era 
officials.
84
 
 In an attempt to complete the revolution, whereby the crimes committed during the 
revolution would be exposed, Morsi’s government has formed a commission, comprised of 
judges, security officers, rights lawyers and families of victims, to investigate the human rights 
violations that occurred in the time period between the 2011 protests which toppled Mubarak and 
the nearly 17 months of military rule that followed.
85
 However, human rights groups and several 
                                                          
80
 Mohamed Morsi’s name has also been translated as “Mursi,” I shall use the “Morsi” spelling throughout this 
paper. 
81
 Egyptian Appeals Court Orders Mubarak Retrial, supra note 61. 
82
 Batrawy, supra note 65.  
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. 
85
 Rights Activists say Egypt’s Morsi is Ignoring Commission Report Detailing State Atrocities, WASHINGTON POST, 
Apr. 20, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/rights-activists-says-egypts-morsi-is-ignoring-
commission-report-detailing-state-atrocities/2013/04/20/3c9ec59e-a9d3-11e2-9e1c-bb0fb0c2edd9_story.html. 
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members of the commission accuse Morsi of not only ignoring the finding reported in the 
commission’s report but also of a lack of transitional justice to ensure that Mubarak, and 
Mubarak era officials, are held accountable for the crimes that occurred during the protests.
86
 
However, Morsi is stuck between a proverbial rock and a hard place, while he requires the 
support of both the military and the police; an adoption of the commission’s findings would 
alienate both the military and the police as the commission’s findings most likely implicates both 
the military and police.
87
 
 After the nearly 17 months of military rule, which are the subject of the commission’s 
report, elections were held on June 24, 2012 and Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood 
was elected as Egypt’s president.88 Morsi has not fulfilled the democratic promise that was 
inherent in Egypt’s first election since the toppling of the Mubarak regime. Since his election, 
Morsi, and his Muslim Brotherhood party, has been accused of stifling dissent, putting on trial 
workers of foreign nongovernmental organizations, drafting a constitution which excluded 
opposition minorities and was deemed to be too vague to protect citizen rights, and imposing 
martial law after violent protests.
89
 Furthermore, Egypt has struggled financially under Morsi as 
tourist revenues plummeted, foreign investment decreased, youth unemployment has increased, 
fuel shortages, bread shortages and violent protests near one of Egypt’s most important economic 
                                                          
86
 Id. 
87
 Id. 
88
 David D. Kirkpatrick, Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslim-brotherhood-declared-as-egypts-
president.html?_r=0&pagewanted=all. 
89
 Ved P. Nanda, The Arab Spring, the Responsibility to Protect, and U.S. Foreign Policy – Some Preliminary 
Thoughts, 41 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 7, 9 (2012); Salma Abdelaziz, Morsy signs Egypt’s Constitution into Law, 
CNN, Dec. 26, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/25/world/africa/egypt-constitution; see also Morsi Declares 
Martial Law in Parts of Egypt After Days of Clashes, ALBAWABA NEWS, Jan. 28, 2013, 
http://www.albawaba.com/news/egypt-martial-law-466667; Egypt’s NGO Crackdown, AL-JAZEERA, last modified 
Dec. 31, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2011/12/201112319284865888.html (“Egyptian 
security forces have stormed the offices of at least 17 human rights and pro-democracy groups across the 
country…accused by Egypt's military rulers of destabilising security by fomenting protests with the help of foreign 
funding.”) 
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resources, the Suez Canal have all taken a toll on the Egyptian economy. 
90
 Egypt also continues 
to experience political turmoil as the minority opposition believes that their voice is not being 
heard in government while continuing street protests demand a complete overhaul of 
government.
91
 
B. The Butcher of Bagdad: Saddam Hussein  
 Saddam Hussein (“Saddam”) rose to power in the Ba’athist military coup of 1968 as head 
of the security forces.
92
 Saddam would subsequently be promoted to vice president and take over 
the presidency in 1979 after the resignation of Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr.
93
 Saddam’s rule of Iraq 
was characterized by a brutal and systematic repression of all citizens and punctuated by 
atrocities committed by both Hussein and his fellow Ba’ath officials.94 Atrocities carried out by 
the Saddam regime has resulted in the death and displacement of Iraqi citizens,
95
 the death and 
displacement of Iraq’s Kurdish population,96 repression of various cultures,97 and the invasion of 
                                                          
90
 Suez Canal residents defy President Morsi’s Curfew, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, Jan. 29, 2013, 
http://www.acus.org/egyptsource/top-news-suez-canal-residents-defy-president-morsis-curfew; David D. 
Kirkpatrick, Short of Money, Egypt Sees Crisis on Fuel and Food, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/world/middleeast/egypt-short-of-money-sees-crisis-on-food-and-
gas.html?pagewanted=all; Egypt’s Morsi Plans to Reshuffle Cabinet, AL-JAZEERA, Apr. 20, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/04/201342016485641796.html. 
91
 Abdelaziz, supra note 89; Egypt’s Morsi Plans to Reshuffle Cabinet, supra note 90. 
92
 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH 
TRIBUNAL 1, 9 (Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal eds., 2000). 
93
 Id. 
94
 Michael J. Frank, Justice For Iraq, Justice for All, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 303, 308 (2004). 
95
 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, LIFE UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN: PAST REPRESSIONS AND ATROCITIES 
BY SADDAM HUSSEIN’S REGIME (2003), http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/19675.htm (approximately 900,000 
Iraqis were displaced by Hussein’s policies as Kurds fled Hussein’s Arabization campaigns, which forced Kurds to 
renounce their Kurdish identity or lose their property, and Marsh Arabs who fled when their marshes were dried up 
as part of the government’s campaign for agricultural use); The Mass Graves of al-Mahawil, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, May 29, 2003, http://www.hrw.org/node/12322/section/3 (multiple mass graves were discovered near the 
al-Mahawil military base, believed to be victims of the violent campaign undertaken by the Hussein government in 
the wake of the failed Shi’a uprising of 1991) 
96
 U.S. Department of State, supra note 95 (Hussein’s 1987-1988 campaign of terror against Kurdish villagers 
included the use of chemical agents against the villages and resulted in the death of upwards of 50,00 Kurdish 
citizens and destruction of some 2,000 villages); see also David A. Korn, HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAQ 8 (1990), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/Iraq90N.pdf (“After using chemical weapons to crush a Kurdish 
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Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
98
 Saddam’s rule would effectively end with the March 2003 invasion 
of Iraq by the United States.
99
 While there were a myriad of reasons given for the invasion of 
Iraq,
100
 and there is dispute as to whether the invasion was legal under the auspices of 
international law,
101
 what would be undisputed is that the United States played an integral part in 
the trial of Saddam subsequent to his capture on December 13, 2003 by American forces.
102
 
 The purpose of the Iraqi High Tribunal (Tribunal) was to prosecute former Iraqi leaders, 
including Saddam, “for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of 
aggression.”103 The Tribunal was established on December 10, 2003 by the United States-
appointed Iraqi Governing Council and subsequently ratified by the Iraqi National Assembly.
104
 
Immediately upon the establishment of the Tribunal, a criticism levied against the Tribunal was 
that the process of setting up the Tribunal was not sufficiently transparent, as the drafters did not 
consult experts on international war crimes tribunals and the statute was not made available for 
public comment prior to its ratification.
105
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
insurgency in 1987 and 1988, the Iraqi government [] engaged in a forced relocation program of such proportions 
that it threatens Kurdish ethnic identity and cultural survival.”) 
97
 U.S. Department of State, supra note 95 (Hussein implemented regulations which put severe restrictions on the 
religious practices of Shi’a Muslim and instituted a policy of Arabization whereby Kurds had to choose between 
revoking their Kurdish identity or forfeiting their property to the government.)  
98
 1990: Iraq Invades Kuwait, BBC NEWS, Aug 2, 1990, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/2/newsid_2526000/2526937.stm. 
99
 Melissa Patterson, Who’s got the Title? Or, the Remnants of Debellatio in Post-Invasion Iraq, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 
467, 467 (2006).  
100
 Victor David Hanson, Why Did we Invade Iraq? FREE REPUBLIC, Mar. 26, 2013, 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/3000898/posts. 
101
 Contrast David Brown, Iraq and the 800-Pound Gorilla Revisited: Good and Bath Faith, and Humanitarian 
Intervention, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004) with wen MacAskill & Julian Borger, Iraw War was 
Illegal and Breached UN Charter, says Annan, GUARDIAN, Sep. 15, 2004, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq. 
102
 See generally The Rise and Fall of a Dictator, CNN, Dec. 14, 2003, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/12/14/sprj.irq.saddam.profile/. 
103
 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH 
TRIBUNAL, supra note 92, at 3.  
104
 Basic Information about the Iraqi High Tribunal, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE 
IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL, supra note 92, at 57. 
105
 Try Saddam in a Credible Court, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Dec. 23, 2003, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2003/12/22/try-saddam-credible-court. 
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 The Tribunal consisted of two 5-person trial chambers and one 9-person appeals 
Chamber.
106
 The Tribunal statutes were crafted from a hybrid of Iraqi and international law.
107
 
While the Tribunal was
108
 staffed exclusively with Iraqi prosecutors and judges, it would look to 
the United Nations Tribunals for legal precedent and use international experts to advise the legal 
staff comprised exclusively of Iraqi prosecutors and judges.
109
 Additionally, the Tribunal 
functioned as a hybrid legal instrument as it had the authority to prosecute crimes under both 
international and Iraqi laws.
110
  
 The Tribunal statute drew from the International Criminal Court Statute for the creation 
of jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
111
 The Tribunal statute 
also drew from Iraqi laws pre-dating Saddam Hussein’s 1968 ascension to power for the creation 
of jurisdiction over judiciary manipulation charges, the waste of national resources and public 
funds and assets, and an act of aggression against a fellow Arab country.
112
 In addition to 
resurrecting pre-Saddam Iraqi laws, the Tribunal further minimized the influence that Saddam’s 
reign had on it by ensuring that the Tribunal’s exclusively Iraqi judges were not members of 
Saddam’s Ba’ath Party.113 It was the responsibility of the Iraqi Governing Council, in association 
                                                          
106
 Basic Information about the Iraqi High Tribunal, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE 
IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL, supra note 92, at 57. 
107
 Id. at 58. 
108
 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, IRAQ (2011),  
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186638.pdf (The Tribunal was dissolved effective July 2011 with 
Trial Chamber 1 and Trial Chamber 2 continuing operating in order to resolve pending cases); see also Kurds 
Oppose Dissolution of Court that Sentenced Saddam Hussein to Death, EKURD.NET, 
http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/4/state4993.htm (Apr. 18, 2011) (The Kurds were opposed to the 
dissolution of the parliament, perceiving it to be a political move which would prevent the bringing to justice of 
individuals responsible for the atrocities committed under the Saddam regime.)  
109
 Basic Information about the Iraqi High Tribunal, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE 
IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL, supra note 92, at 58. 
110
 Id. at 59. 
111
 MICHAEL A. NEWTON & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, ENEMY OF THE STATE 56 (2008). .  
112
 Id. at 59. 
113
 Id. 
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with the Iraqi Bar Association, which had the responsibility of vetting the Tribunal judges of 
Ba’ath members.114 
 Saddam Hussein would be charged with a panoply of human rights abuses, including the 
1988 chemical gas attack in Halabja resulting in the death of 5,000 Kurds, the killing or 
deporting of more than 200,000 Kurds during the Anfal Campaign of the 1980’s, invading 
Kuwait in 1990, the drying of rivers resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Marsh 
Arabs,
115
 and the Dujail campaign undertaken as retaliation for an assassination attempt against 
Hussein while he was visiting the region.
116
 From the inception of the trial, Saddam Hussein 
refused to acknowledge the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over him, stating that “I didn’t say ‘former 
president,’ I said ‘president,’ and I have rights according to the constitution, among them 
immunity from prosecution.”117  
 Saddam Hussein’s claim of immunity from prosecution and denial of the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction over him were for naught. On November 5, 2006, the Tribunal found Saddam 
Hussein guilty of “crimes against humanity inflicted upon the civilian population of Ad-Dujayl 
following a failed assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein that occurred there in 1982” 
and sentenced Hussein to death.
118
 Justice was swift and Saddam Hussein was executed less than 
2 months later on December 30, 2006.
119
  
 Critics were swift to condemn the Tribunal as a mere puppet of the occupying power, the 
United States.
120
 Many of these critics pointed to the de-Ba’athification of the Tribunal as 
                                                          
114
 Id. 
115
 Id. 
116
 Judging Dujail: The First Trial Before the Iraqi High Tribunal, 18 Human Rights Watch, 1, 2 (2006), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq1106webwcover.pdf. 
117
 NEWTON & SCHARF, supra note 111, at 3. 
 
 
120
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evidence of the Tribunal’s puppet status.121 Critics argued that since the vast majority of the Iraqi 
senior judges were part of the Ba’ath party, exclusion of judges affiliated with the Ba’ath party 
undermined the overall competency of the Tribunal judges.
122
 The Tribunal was also criticized 
for allowing only Iraqis to serve as judges and prosecutors.
123
 While conceding that it was 
desirable for the Iraqis to play a major role in the Tribunal, critics argued that the Iraqi judicial 
system, isolated for years from developments in international jurisprudence and having no trials 
lasting more than a couple of days, was simply incapable of prosecuting a case as complex as the 
Saddam trial.
124
 
 Michael P. Scharf, a vocal critic of the Tribunal, subsequently became a convert and 
emerged as a vocal supporter of the Tribunal. Scharf argued that the Tribunal was more 
independent of the United States than was popularly believed,for the following five reasons: 1) 
the Iraqis played a larger role in drafting the Tribunal’s governing statute than widely reported 
by the media; 2) the United States had no direct control over the selection of the Tribunal judges; 
3) the United States Department of Justice’s Regime Crime Liaison Office in Bagdad maintained 
an arms-length relationship with the Tribunal to ensure that there would be no appearance of 
impropriety; 4) the Tribunal judges were incredibly committed and in many cases risked their 
lives by serving on the Tribunal and allowing their identities to be disclosed during the televised 
trial; and 5) the rules of procedure used by the Tribunal conformed to international norms.
125
 
 Critics derided all aspects of the Tribunal as lacking the capacity to provide a fair trial to 
the defendant. Commentators criticized the Tribunal’s statute, citing to a provision of the statute 
which was adopted from a 1958 Iraqi law, stating that the drafting of the provision was so vague 
                                                          
121
 Id. 
122
 Id. 
123
 Try Saddam in a Credible Court, supra note 105. 
124
 Id. 
125
 Id. at 4-7.  
Anna Uger, Final Draft 
 
Page 18 of 30 
 
that it was susceptible to an interpretation which would allow the statute to be applied to purely 
political offenses.
126
 Furthermore, the administrative capacities of the Tribunal were criticized as 
non-existent, with Tribunal personnel themselves stating that it was difficult to even determine 
which documents and motions have been submitted.
127
 The lack of administrative capacities was 
seen as detrimental to the court’s ability to perform essential trial functions, such as document 
management and witness protection.
128
  
 Commentators would also question the impartiality of the Tribunal due to the lack of 
independence granted to the Tribunal judges to fulfill their duties.
129
 Critics focused on two 
sections of the Tribunal statute, Article 4(4) which allowed a Tribunal judge to be transferred to 
the Higher Judicial Council by the Council of Ministers, thereby removing the judge’s right to 
adjudicate Tribunal cases, and Article 33 which while allowing for the de-Ba’athification of the 
judges did not specify the procedure to follow to determine whether the individual judge was a 
member of the Ba’ath party.130 Critics argued that Article 4(4) and Article 33 allowed the 
Council of Ministers unbridled power to remove judges thereby curtailing the independence of 
the judiciary by the implicit threat hanging over each judge, that they could be removed by the 
Council of Ministers at any time.
131
 The Human Rights Watch also alleged that the Tribunal did 
not properly apprise defendants of the charges against and them and deprived the defendants of a 
reasonable amount of time to defend against the charges.
132
 
                                                          
126
 Judging Dujail: The First Trial Before the Iraqi High Tribunal, supra note 116 at 8-9.  
127
 Id. at 14, 17-18. 
128
 Id. at 14. 
129
 Id. at 39. 
130
 Id.  
131
 Judging Dujail: The First Trial Before the Iraqi High Tribunal, supra note 116 at 39-40 (Of particular concern 
was the willingness of the legislature to intervene in judicial independence in order to appease public opinion, 
usually when a judge was perceived by the public as being sympathetic to Saddam Hussein.)  
132
 Id. at 44-48. 
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 The condemnation of the Tribunal continued after the verdict sentencing Saddam to death 
was handed down. The Human Rights Watch argued that the evidence used to convict Saddam 
failed to meet the necessary burden of proof; mainly that Saddam knew and intended that his 
orders result in the massacre at Ad-Dujayl.
133
 The Human Rights Watch also condemned the 
appeals process itself, arguing that the Tribunal statute’s provision mandating an execution take 
place within 30 days of the final appeal ensured that Saddam’s lawyers were not able to properly 
respond to the verdict.
134
  
 The rationale for the criticism of the Tribunal and the international public’s indignation at 
the Tribunal was perhaps best expressed by Professor Curtis Doebbler
135
 who said: 
think about it as if another country came to the United States, decided it didn’t 
like President Bush and the Republicans in power because they thought that 
President Bush was a war criminal for having committed crimes of aggression 
against other countries, invaded the United States, and then put him on trial 
claiming that they would give him a fair trial. That is the situation right now that 
we face in Iraq.
136
  
III. Why try a deposed dictator?  
 An obvious question that may arise is why put a deposed dictator on trial at all? Why 
allow the deposed dictator the privilege of a trial, with all of its attendant vagaries and 
uncertainties, when the dictator had for so long denied that privilege to his nation’s citizens?137 
Henry Kissinger argued that the trials of deposed dictators only risk fanning the flames of peace 
                                                          
133
 Id. at 75-83 
134
 Id.; see also Iraq: Saddam Hussein Put to Death, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Dec. 30, 2006, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/12/29/iraq-saddam-hussein-put-death. 
 
135
 Doebbler, Curtis, GENEVA DIPLOMACY.COM, http://genevadiplomacy.com/doebbler-curtis (last visited April 15, 
2013) (an international human rights lawyer who practices before various United Nations Tribunals as well as the 
International Court of Justice, the African Commission and Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the European 
Court of Justice). 
136
 NEWTON & SCHARF, supra note 111, at 67. 
137
 GARY JONATHON BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES 7 (2000). 
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into war as people attempt to achieve personal retribution.
138
 Seemingly, the easier method 
would be to simply leap directly to the punishment of the deposed dictator.
139
 
 However, the trial of a deposed dictator, as discussed using the framework of the Saddam 
Hussein and Hosni Mubarak trials,
140
 can be argued to fulfill a two-fold function. The most 
obvious function of a trial of a deposed dictator is the same as the function of any criminal trial, 
to ascertain the guilt of the accused and if found guilty, to punish the defendant accordingly.
141
 
However, a perhaps less obvious, but arguably more important, function of a trial of a deposed 
dictator is to promote a national reconciliation process by which the nation can move forward 
from the era of repression into a new era of freedom and liberty.
142
 
 In looking at the Mubarak trial and whether such a trial would bring justice for Egyptians 
through the judicial system, commentators focused on both how the trial would proceed and 
what justice would be delivered.
143
 The aims of the trial were as varied as the interests in Egypt. 
Some viewed the trial as a release valve for the anger and discontent that had been fueling the 
Tahrir Square, some wanted qasas
144
 for Mubarak’s 30 years of corruption and dictatorship, and 
some wanted Mubarak punished for the deaths that resulted from the violent suppression of the 
Tahrir Square protests.
145
 Many Egyptians viewed the trial as a means of retaliation, or qisas, 
                                                          
138
 Id. at 10 citing HENRY A. KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED: METTERNICH, CASTLEREAGH, AND THE PROBLEMS OF 
PEACE, 1812-1822, 138 (1973). 
139
 Bass, supra note 137, at 7.  
140
 Supra, Part II.  
141
 Bass, supra note 137, at 12-13. 
142
 Bass, supra note 137, at 290-304. 
143
 Sadiki, supra note 40; Mikhail & Zayed , supra note 11; Egypt: Q&A on the Trial of Hosni Mubarak, supra note 
36. 
144
 Sadiki, supra note 40 (defining qasas, alternatively spelled qisas, as the Quaranic word for justice); but see Susan 
C. Hascall, Restorative Justice in Islam: Should Qisas be Considered a Form of Restorative Justice 2 (Duquesne 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2012-11), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2120726 
(defining qisas crimes as intentional wounding and homicide and one in which the wronged party may forgive the 
defendant and demand no punishment, demand payment as compensation for the crime or may demand retaliation); 
MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE 145 (1984) (defining adl as the Quaranic word for justice). 
145
 Sadiki, supra note 40. 
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against Mubarak for three decades of rule.
146
 In looking at the variety of goals that Egyptians had 
for a Mubarak trial, it is evident that these goals would not have been fulfilled if Mubarak had 
simply been quietly punished.  
 In putting Saddam Hussein on trial, Iraqis believed that creating a neutral decision-maker, 
the Iraqi High Tribunal, and televising the trial would ensure a transparent trial that would aid 
Iraq in moving forward to a better and brighter future.
147
 The death sentence handed down to 
Saddam Hussein by the Tribunal was perceived to be the precursor to a law-abiding Iraqi society 
whereas Saddam Hussein’s execution without the intervening trial would have been merely an 
Iraq trapped by revenge.
148
 However, in order for Saddam’s trial to have served as a precursor to 
a law-abiding Iraqi society, the trial must have been perceived as free and fair. Unfortunately, 
Saddam’s manipulation of the trial portrayed the Tribunal as unjust and a tool of the American 
occupiers.
149
 Saddam argued that as he was supported by the United States during the 1980’s, he 
could not have been the monster portrayed by the prosecutor at the trial.
150
 Saddam’s efforts to 
portray the Tribunal as nothing more than victor’s justice is harmful to the national reconciliation 
that the trial should promote as it cannot provide the necessary catharsis to Iraq to allow the 
nation to continue their journey to a law abiding society.  
 The importance of a deposed dictator’s trial stretches beyond the borders of the dictator’s 
nation and into the surrounding region. Saddam’s trial would be important not only in Iraq but 
also in Iraq’s fellow Arab countries. Saddam’s portrayal of himself as an Arab Muslim 
humiliated by American might could potentially bolster the belief held in Arab countries that 
                                                          
146
 Mikhail & Zayed, supra note 11 ("’This is the dream of Egyptians, to see him like this, humiliated like he 
humiliated them for the last 30 years,’ said Ghada Ali, the mother of a 17-year old girl in the city of Alexandria who 
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 NEWTON & SCHARF, supra note 111, at 1. 
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18, 2003). 
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they are impotent in the face of American might.
151
 Saddam’s role as a Ba’ath Party leader 
would confer further authority upon him, and give added weight to his words, in his capacity as 
spokesperson to the Arab peoples.
152
 Furthermore, Saddam’s portrayal of himself as an Arab 
Muslim and Ba’ath Party leader humiliated by American might and unjustly removed from 
power would resonate especially strongly in a region replete with strongmen-led governments.
153
 
The sight of a fellow Arab dictator deposed by the United States and held accountable for 
atrocities committed during his reign can strike fear into the hearts of other Middle Eastern 
dictators wary of the same fate.
154
 Many hope that the Mubarak trial will inspire fellow Arab 
countries to hold their dictators, and those responsible for atrocities, accountable.
155
 Therefore, in 
order to ensure that the trial of a deposed dictator becomes a platform for national reconciliation, 
rather than a source of tension and strife within the region, the trial must not be perceived as “a 
bunch of Westerners imposing victor's justice."
156
  
 The perception of the Saddam trial as imposed by the United States in a form of “victor’s 
justice” was not helped by the gloating words of the then-United States President George W. 
Bush, who, upon hearing of Saddam’s capture,157 stated that, “now the former dictator of Iraq 
will face the justice he denied to millions.”158 President Bush then predicted that the Iraqi 
                                                          
151
 Id. 
152
 Tarik Kafala, The Iraqi Baath Party, BBC, Mar. 25, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2886733.stm 
(Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party preached a message of pan-Arab, secular nationalism.) 
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 Kitfield, Freedberg & Hegland, supra note 149. 
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 Liaquat Ali Khan, The Dictators of the Middle East, HUFF POST, Nov. 26, 2012, 
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peoples would “not have to fear the rule of Saddam Hussein ever again. All Iraqis who take the 
side of freedom have taken the winning side.”159 
 A fair trial for a deposed dictator can simultaneously promote national reconciliation and 
serve as a deterrent to regional strongmen. What steps can then be taken to ensure that a trial is 
perceived as fair rather than as enforcement of “victor’s justice”? A fair trial must be 
commenced at the request of the deposed dictator’s nation, ensuring that the region’s rulers are 
not threatened by foreign influence in a neighboring nation. However, the sight of a dictator on 
trial for the atrocities committed during his rule could persuade regional strongmen to be more 
respectful of their populations lest they meet the same fate. Saddam’s trial, despite its flaws, can 
be viewed as having a regional deterrence effect as it represented a watershed moment in which 
the adjudication of an Arab dictator signaled a warning to the rest of the region’s dictators that 
their populations could no longer be repressed with impunity.
160
  
 The differentiation that must be drawn between the effects of a “victor’s justice” trial and 
the deterrence provided by a trial initiated at the request of the deposed dictator’s nation is that 
the source of the leaders’ fears is different. In the instance of the “victor’s justice” trial, the 
dictator’s fear is that the United States, or another superpower, invades their sovereign lands and 
then orchestrates a puppet tribunal to try the deposed dictator. In instances of a trial initiated at 
the request of the deposed dictator’s nation, the dictators fear their own subjects, perhaps making 
the dictators less likely to repress their population. However, it can be argued that a “victor’s 
justice” trial can also provide a deterrence effect as nations may seek accommodation with the 
United States.
161
 However, a “victor’s justice” tribunal may have the negative effect of causing 
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an arms war as nations, with North Korea being a prime example, build up military arsenals in 
preparation of war.
162
  
IV. After the Deposing of a Dictator: The Long Road to National Reconciliation  
A. Tribunals: Merely the First Step on the Long Road to National Reconciliation  
 Commentators have argued that a fair trial can be used as a springboard to achieve a full 
rule of law after the fall of a dictator.
163
 In order to aid the reconciliation process, a tribunal must 
be seen as being fair to all participants in the conflict.
164
 An argument for trying heads of state 
under international auspices is that the tribunal would be perceived as fair by all participants as 
an international tribunal is free from the “constraints of national policies and prejudices.”165 
Since an international tribunal functions outside of the sphere of national politics, a belief is 
created that it is impartial and therefore fair to all parties.
166
 Therefore, the international 
tribunal’s reputation for impartiality may promote peace and reconciliation within the nation.167 
A tribunal also furthers national reconciliation by providing the truth through its evidentiary, 
fact-finding processes.
168
 
 It is also important to note that while international tribunals may be perceived as fair, 
they can also be perceived as mere puppets of world politics and thus a de-legitimization of the 
adjudicatory process.
169
 Nations may also wish to use national tribunals to try their deposed 
                                                          
162
 Id. 
163
 See Eldakak, supra note 15, at 293 (proposing that the trial of Hosni Mubarak was an integral part of the 
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dictators as a matter of pride. Iraqis chose a domestic tribunal to try Saddam because of an 
understandable, national pride in a long tradition of Iraqi legal institutions, from the Hammurabi 
Code, to the rights of citizens embedded in the Iraqi constitution as of 1921 to the integral part 
that the integrity of the Iraqi bar association played in the Iraq ascension to the League of 
Nations.
170
 In Egypt, a national tribunal was chosen to try Mubarak, in part, to ensure that the 
judiciary was able to assert its independence from Mubarak-era officials.
171
 
 While an international tribunal may be, in theory, the perfect vehicle for reconciliation, 
an analysis of international tribunals in action offers a unique opportunity to compare theory and 
practice. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) became the first to apprehend, 
arrest and try a former prime minister, Jean Kambanda.
172
 The trial of Jean Kambanda 
demonstrated that a former head of state could not be certain of immunity from prosecution.
173
 
The ICTR proved to all heads of states that they would be held accountable for all crimes against 
humanity as there was an international apparatus established for their adjudication.
174
 An 
international tribunal, such as the ICTR, serves as an international deterrent of state-sponsored 
crimes as heads of states can no longer depend on immunity from prosecution in such cases.
175
 
Furthermore, international tribunals promote reconciliation
176
 not only in the nation for which 
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the international tribunal was formed, but also the global community at large.
177
 Even for 
international tribunals whose statutes do not explicitly mention the process of reconciliation as 
an aim, the process of reconciliation always remains an important, if implicit, objective of every 
international tribunal.
178
 
 As this is not a perfect world,
179
 international tribunals have not always been successful 
in achieving their reconciliation objective. For the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), reconciliation was an implicit objective.
180
 However, the ICTY was unable 
to meet its reconciliation objectives as individuals whose families were either killed or 
disappeared during the conflict rejected reconciliation, arguing that they could never forgive 
those who killed their loved ones and expelled them from their homes.
181
 
 An international tribunal may be unable to bring reconciliation to a nation’s peoples for a 
multitude of reasons. In many instances, the tribunals were created to adjudicate incidents in 
which there is a clear demarcation of combatants.
182
 Therefore, in order for reconciliation to all 
of the combatants must accept the tribunal as just. A major reason for why the ICTY failed to 
meet its reconciliation objective is because the Tribunal was viewed as biased, and therefore 
unjust, by both combatants in the controversy, the Croats and Serbs.
183
 Furthermore, the 
combatants viewed the ICTY as a mere imposition by the NATO-led occupiers, or a “victor’s 
justice” Tribunal, rather than an impartial tribunal which could be trusted to provide a just 
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result
184
 Whether the ICTY even had jurisdiction in the controversy was also widely questioned. 
Many of the combatants considered the conflict to be a civil war rather than a war of aggression, 
negating the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the controversy since an international tribunal could not 
have jurisdiction over a purely domestic matter.
185
 Another source of disgruntlement with the 
ICTY was the lack of information made available by the ICTY.
186
 Overall. the ICTY did a poor 
job of disseminating information and failed to educate the national public on what individuals 
were being tried, what offenses those individuals were being charged with, and what the 
elements of such offenses were.
187
 
 The former Yugoslavian public also perceived the ICTY to be a mere tool of the NATO-
led occupying forces, allowing the occupying powers to punish only those political leaders who 
inflicted the most gruesome suffering onto the population while allowing the remaining political 
leaders to consolidate their ethnic cleansing gains by providing for a partition of the country.
188
 It 
can be argued that by providing for “justice” under the guise of an international tribunal, while 
simultaneously entrenching the ill-gotten gains of ethnic cleansing by ensuring those who fled 
the nation could never return, is more damaging to the process of reconciliation than doing 
nothing at all. 
 However, an international tribunal can rehabilitate itself in the eyes of those whose 
interests it is meant to protect. The ICTY has painstakingly battled its way to relevancy in 
promoting reconciliation by arresting and putting on trial more of those responsible for the ethnic 
cleansing.
189
 The ICTY’s renewed efforts in the arena of trying more of those responsible has, 
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indirectly, allowed for the resettlement of the lands by those displaced by the ethnic cleansing.
190
 
Furthermore, the ICTY has also providing the national public with records of the trials which has 
led to a greater national understanding and acceptance of the atrocities that occurred.
191
 
B. Promoting National Reconciliation: The Long Road After Tribunals  
 Justice “requires not only justice before a court of law after the fact, but preventative 
social justice.”192 Therefore, reconciliation in countries torn apart by a dictator’s rule must 
consist of a two-step process, justice in a court of law
193
 and a further truth finding mission to 
enable the nation to heal.
194
 An integral part of the truth finding mission is transitional justice, a 
concept which traces its origins to post-World War II and encompasses tribunals.
195
 Perhaps 
most notably, transitional justice has been implemented by the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, the de-Nazification of Germany, and the trial of Japanese soldiers for war 
atrocities.
196
 Transitional justice is commonly viewed as measures that a society undertakes to 
come to terms with national legacies of systematic human rights abuse in order to facilitate a 
progression from a period of violent upheaval or repression to a period of peace and rule of 
law.
197
  
 The idea of transitional justice encompasses the use of tribunals to not only provide 
justice but also help heal the nation by stopping the abuses, identifying and bringing those 
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responsible to justice and providing reparations to the victims.
198
 Such tribunal measures include 
not only trials and prosecutions, discussed in the instances of Mubarak and Hussein above,
199
 but 
also truth commissions.
200
 While trials are centered on the prosecution of those responsible for 
the systematic human rights abuses, truth commissions investigate the abuses through truth 
telling public hearings.
201
 However, transitional measures include additional measures and 
methods used to promote healing within a nation, including dialogue within the society, a 
museum and archive memorializing the atrocities, a restitution process, educational reforms, 
institutional reforms, and the purging of officials implicated in the past governmental abuse from 
governmental agencies.
202
 These measures, taken subsequent to a trial, are meant to prevent 
future abuses, preserve the nation’s peace and rule or law, as well as aid in national 
reconciliation.
203
  
V. Conclusion 
 "If there's one lesson we've learned from the transition of other traumatized societies, it's 
that this process of rehabilitation takes much longer than people anticipate.”204 For instance, 
Argentina and Chile are still revisiting old questions that they considered long settled.”205 In 
order for hard-won peace to last, transitional justice must achieve two objectives. Transitional 
justice must not be perceived to be a victor’s justice and it must build up an infrastructure which 
can ensure that past human rights mistakes are not repeated. Instead of promoting peace, the 
flawed trials of Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein have only served to fragment their nations. 
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Fragmentation has forced Iraq and Egypt to a standstill, as the same factions which existed under 
the dictator, continue to thrive and cause strive to the present day. It is not until national 
reconciliation is achieved that Iraq and Egypt can start to thrive socially and politically. 
 
  
